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BOOK REVIEW 
POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX. By William A. 
Klein.* Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1976. Pp. 
614. $14.50. 
Reviewed by J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.? 
Canon 8 of the American Bar Association's Code of Profes- 
sional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer should assist in 
improving the legal system."' Relevant Ethical Considerations 
expand on the meaning of Canon 8 as follows: 
By reason of education and experience, lawyers are especially 
qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to 
initiate corrective measures therein. Thus they should partici- 
pate in proposing and supporting legislation and programs to 
improve the system, without regard to the general interests or 
desires of clients or former  client^.^ 
The Ethical Considerations also explain that lawyers "should 
encourage the simplification of laws and the repeal or amend- 
ment of laws that  are outmoded. Likewise, legal procedures 
should be improved whenever experience indicates a change is 
needed ."3 
If law students are to be trained to carry out their prospective 
law-reform duty as described in the foregoing passages with re- 
spect to improving the federal income tax system, and if the 
current bar is to adequately discharge its obligation in this re- 
gard, there ought to be a volume to which both students and 
practitioners can go for comprehensive explication of the federal 
income tax's fundamental policy considerations. Professor Wil- 
liam A. Klein's Policy Analysis of the Federal Income Tax at- 
tempts to meet these needs.4 Although i t  fails to completely 
achieve the desired ends, the book's accomplishments are suffi- 
ciently substantial to make i t  an impressive and highly stimulat- 
ing piece of work. 
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. A.B., 1952; L.L.B., 1957, 
Harvard University. Member of the District of Columbia and Wisconsin Bars. 
t Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. B.S., 
1964, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1967, George Washington University. Member of 
the Washington Bar. 
1. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 8. 
2. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 8-1. 
3. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 8-2. 
4. W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX %vii (1976). 
BOOK REVIEW 
In spite of its overall strength, the book begins weakly. Klein 
states that his objective is to "explicate the basic principles, theo- 
ries and tools of analysis that are needed for sensible, serious 
discussion of federal income tax p~ l icy . "~  Given that objective, an 
evaluation of the income tax's relative merits vis-a-vis other 
forms of taxation would be in order! Klein recognizes this point 
by stating that "[ilt is useful . . . to begin with an effort . . . 
to put the structural problems in a broader perspective, to ask 
why it is that we want to tax people on the basis of their incomes 
. . . [and] to examine some alternatives . . . . 9 9 7  
Unfortunately, Klein fails to follow through. After a short, 
inconclusive paragraph dealing with taxes based on benefit, he 
states that "we will make no further effort to examine the proper 
scope for application of the benefit principle? An additional 
disclaimer of any design to investigate sumptuary taxes as an 
alternative to the income taxg is followed by an initially promising 
investigation of the head tax. Klein points out that the head tax 
has no disincentive effect on work and is probably no more diffi- 
cult to assess and enforce than the income tax.1° But having cre- 
ated a modest feeling of warmth in the reader for a tax which, 
because of its past association in this country with attempts to 
prevent blacks from voting, has been viewed by many as a pariah 
of the revenue world, Klein summarily dismisses further inquiry 
into the subject with the following statement: 
The appeal of the head tax diminishes rapidly, however, 
even for a primitive society, as we begin to take account of the 
fact that people will have differing physical capabilities, and 
will, consequently, differ in their capacities to contribute. As we 
begin to think along those lines and to extrapolate to a complex 
industrial society, we are drawn more and more toward tradi- 
tional notions of ability to pay." 
The head tax has features which make it unattractive to many. 
But the foregoing is hardly an adequate rejection of the tax as an 
- 
5. Id. 
6. See, e.g., R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 11-37 (1964). 
7. W.  KLEIN, supra note 4, at 1. 
8. Id. at 2. For a discussion of problems encountered in using the benefit principle to 
allocate the tax burden, see W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION 35-39 (1953) [hereinafter cited as BLUM]. 
9. W. KLEW, supra note 4, at 2. 
10. Id. at 3. 
11. Id. at 4. 
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alternative to the income tax, particularly in a book which pur- 
ports to be devoted to "basic principles."I2 
After also dismissing taxes on wealth as a subject for investi- 
gation, Klein finally arrives a t  the following: 
We will proceed for now on the assumption that in shaping our 
tax system we have properly selected income as the appropriate 
objective measure of ability to pay. 
. . . [W]e are now in a position to make more concrete a 
general principle of justice. The general principle-one that 
needs no defense-is that similarly situated people should be 
treated similarly, that equals should be treated equally. In our 
tax system we have decided that equality refers to ability to pay 
and that for ability to pay we substitute income. Thus, we de- 
rive the principle of horizontal equity: the justness of the system 
is measured in part by the extent to which people with equal 
incomes pay equal taxes.I3 
Again, for a book devoted to analysis of fundamentals, the forego- 
ing is an inadequate explanation of why the income tax is to be 
preferred over other taxes. The unadorned invocation of the term 
"ability to pay" does little more than call to mind Louis Eisen- 
stein's assertion that "[tlo speak forcefully of ability to pay is 
merely to indulge in evasive rhetoric."14 Without considerable 
explanation, "ability to pay" possesses little intrinsic meaning 
and no obvious claims for being considered an unassailable foun- 
dation on which to build a tax system.15 In addition, the term can 
be used as forcefully in behalf of an estate tax or property tax as 
in behalf of an income tax. Klein has simply made a declaration 
of faith in favor of the income tax and has asked the rest of us to 
go along without seeing the proof. I am prepared to do so, but in 
directing students and others to material which will illuminate 
the relative advantages of the income tax, I shall have to recom- 
mend sources other than Professor Klein's book. 
12. Id. a t  xvii. 
13. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). 
14. L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 56 (1961). 
15. For discussion of the weaknesses of "ability to pay" as a tax policy guide, see 
BLUM, supra note 8, at  64-68; L. EISENSTEIN, supm note 14, a t  3-56. 
Klein's use of "ability to pay" at  this point is puzzling, since he ultimately deprecates 
it as follows: 
[The concept of ability to pay] . . . is a concept that seems to me to have 
meaning for people who accept the justness of the initial distribution of the 
rewards under capitalism-but not quite. It  is a concept for people who feel that 
inequality is natural enough but who are groping for a way of expressing their 
uneasiness about it without going too far. 
W .  KLEIN, supra note 4 ,  at  43. 
BOOK REVIEW 
Fortunately, the book quickly recovers from this unpromis- 
ing beginning when Klein moves to the ambitious task of con- 
structing an objective justification for progressive income taxa- 
tion. The notion that an income tax should be progressive has 
clung to our tax system with unremitting tenacity in spite of the 
fact that progression has some undeniable vices16 and that no one 
has yet succeeded in building an incontrovertible case in its 
favor." In fact, the difficulties of doing so led Louis Eisenstein to 
conclude that the task should be abandoned. He urged, instead, 
a frank recognition that the existence of progression and the de- 
gree of progression in the income tax simply represent the result 
of a political struggle between various groups in our society en- 
gaged in efforts to shift the tax burden from themselves to others 
and that the principle of progression has no objective basis.IR 
Although a realist, Klein is unwilling to take Eisenstein's advice. 
Klein argues that if a successful case is to be constructed 
for progression, one must openly recognize that progression is 
an income redistribution device which can be justified only by 
first establishing that the present distribution of income under 
our economic system is unjust? Such an undertaking might lure 
the investigator into an attack on capitalism itself. Klein, how- 
ever, eschews this path. He accepts capitalism for its unmatched 
capacity to produce goods and services, but asserts that the dis- 
tribution of capitalism's benefits is unjust and that some way 
must be found to redistribute those benefits without impairing 
the incentives which make the system so p r o d u ~ t i v e . ~ ~  In Klein's 
words, "we will want to ask in what directions and how far we can 
depart from the distribution of rewards under capitalism, to 
achieve greater fairness, without destroying or too significantly 
impairing capitalism's capacity to deliver the goods."*l 
-- 
16. See BLUM, S U P ~  note 8, a t  14-28. 
17. The traditional arguments for progression are thoroughly reviewed and effectively 
criticized in BLUM, supra note 8. 
18. L. EISENSTEIN, supra note 14, a t  3-4,6, 11,33; Eisenstein, Some Second Thoughts 
on Tax Ideologies, 23 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 1, 3 (1965). 
19. Klein states: 
Even if total utility can be increased by taking from you to give to another who 
is less well off but still not poverty stricken, where is the justice in doing so if 
you assume the justice of the initial distribution? That is, suppose that you start 
with the assumption that each person deserves what he or she earns. How can 
it be ethical, or if you prefer, just, to take from one and give to the other? 
W. KLEIN, supra note 4, at 21. See also BLUM, supra note 8, a t  80. 
20. W. KLEIN, supra note 4, a t  21-26. 
21. Id. a t  26. 
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The conclusion that the rewards of capitalism are distributed 
unfairly is reached by using an argument derived from Rawlsian 
original-position analysis.22 Klein asserts that people possessing 
no knowledge of their comparative advantages over each other 
and no knowledge as to how well they will succeed in the future 
would bargain with each other for a distribution of rewards under 
their economic system, which gave all who worked equally hard 
the same reward.23 This bargain would be arrived a t  between 
people who, because of these stipulations of ignorance, were 
trying to protect their unknown interests by constructing the 
most intrinsically just system possible. Klein believes, therefore, 
that the terms of this bargain represent mankind's conception of 
a fair distribution of income.24 
This argument is buttressed with another aspect of Rawlsian 
theory. Klein asserts that since the possession of greater talent 
than one's fellows is a chance, undeserved attribute, it is unjust 
for greater talent to result in greater income per se.25 He argues 
that under a perfectly fair system, inequalities in income should 
arise only from inequalities in effort-i. e . ,  hours w~rked~~-and 
asserts that most inequalities in income among members of our 
society arise from unequal talent rather than from unequal effort 
and are, therefore, unfair.27 
At this point, Klein recognizes that his argument needs a 
refinement to adjust for the realities of human behavior. He 
states: 
The logic of the preceding analysis suggests that the 
[famous concert] pianist should receive no more than the dish- 
22. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-92 (1971). For a criticism of original- 
position analysis, see Charvet, The Idea of Equality As a Substantive Principle of Society, 
17 POL. STUD. 1 (1969). 
23. W. KLEIN, supra note 4, a t  26-29. 
24. Id. at  29-30. 
25. Klein states that: 
One might simply appeal directly to intuition in support of the proposition that 
talent as such does not for reasons of fairness require added reward . . . . Rawls 
puts it in terms of deservedness, saying that it  "is perfectly obvious and has long 
been agreed to . . . [and] is one of the fixed points of our moral judgments that 
no one deserves his place in the distribution of natural assets any more than he 
deserves his initial starting place in society. . . ." Each of these statements 
seems to appeal only to a basic intuitive acceptance of the proposition that there 
is no just connection between one's natural talents and one's economic position. 
Id. at 29. For criticism of this view, see R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 160-61, 
213-27 (1974). 
26. W. KLEIN, supra note 4, a t  30, 36. 
27. Id. at  32. 
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washer for equal hours of work-unless as unfortunately seems 
likely, i t  seems necessary to provide such rewards in order to 
elicit the services. In other words, while fairness points toward 
equality, efficiency may not . . . . 28 
Klein goes on to explain that i t  may be necessary to reward tal- 
ented people unequally in order to get them to produce a t  a level 
which maximizes benefits to society,29 but suggests that the addi- 
tional reward necessary to accomplish this end is less than the 
additional rewards received by talented persons under the pres- 
ent system .30 
His conclusion is that in a fair system, the level of income 
each member should receive (or be allowed to retain) for services3' 
is the amount received by the least talented member of society 
working the same number of hours, plus any additional income 
necessary to induce the individual in question to perform a t  an 
increased level which, after deducting that additional income, 
will leave society with the greatest net aggregate benefit.32 Stated 
differently, society should establish a basic hourly wage applica- 
ble to all members. Each member would then receive an amount 
of income equal to the number of hours worked times the basic 
wage, plus any minimum additional inducement which must be 
paid to get him to increase his efforts to a level which results in 
the greatest net benefit to society. Any income received or re- 
tained by a person above this level represents an unfair distribu- 
tion of the economic system's rewards. Klein believes that indi- 
28. Id. (emphasis in original). 
29. Id. a t  32-35. See generally BLUM, supra note 8, a t  51-53; J. RAWLS, supra note 22, 
a t  150-51. 
30. W. KLEIN, supra note 4, a t  32-35. This suggestion is supported by studies mini- 
mizing the impact of high tax rates on willingness to work. See R. BARLOW, H. BRAZER &
J. MORGAN, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR OF THE AFFLUENT (1966); G. Break, Income Tax Rates and 
Incentives to Work and to Invest in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REVISION 
COMPEND~UM 2247 (Comm. Print 1959). 
31. Klein's approach to investment income is discussed infra. He does not suggest a 
definitive solution for the proper income tax treatment of gifts and inheritances. See W. 
KLEIN, supra note 4, a t  43-45. 
32. W. KLEIN, supra note 4, a t  34, 36, 39. Klein recognizes that his system judges 
fairness in terms of the creation and distribution of economically measurable quantities 
and admits that some may object on grounds that a system can produce more important 
things than material goods and that equal distribution of economic income fails to amelio- 
rate the noneconomic inequalities existing between people such as differences in physical 
skills and capabilities, etc. He dismisses these objections, however, by arguing that since 
they elude any economic measurement, there is no practical way for an economic system 
to deal with them and that in creating an economic system which maximizes total output 
and achieves a more equitable distribution of income, a substantial gain has been 
achieved even if other problems are left unresolved. Id. a t  25-26, 38-39. 
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viduals in our society receive and retain a good deal of income 
above this fair level and that these individuals are concentrated 
in the higher income classes.33 Since progressive taxation tends to 
reduce these unjustified inequalities, it is desirable as a device for 
assisting our system in achieving greater fairness. In Klein's 
words: 
What all this leads to is the proposition that the case for 
progression is by no means an uneasy one. It is based on a 
commitment to fairness in the distribution of the rewards for 
natural talent plus the judgment that most of the economic 
inequality that will be reduced by progression will be inequality 
attributable to differences in talent rather than differences in 
effort, as well as on the judgment that the gains in fairness 
achieved by progression will outweigh any losses in efficien~y.~~ 
Klein's well-developed theory is not without serious weak- 
n e s ~ e s . ~ ~  In order to know how much of a person's total income 
should be subjected to redistribution, we first must deduct the 
income to which he is entitled for his hours of work, plus any 
minimum additional income which must be paid him to stimu- 
late a higher level of effort for the net benefit of society. This 
latter factor is the problem. How are we to tell how much addi- 
tional income, if any, a given taxpayer should be allowed to retain 
over his basic hourly wage in order to induce him to a level of 
effort which yields a net benefit in output for all remaining tax- 
payers? I t  should be clear from the history of income taxation in 
America that we cannot rely on the taxpayer to accurately report 
the minimum amount of additional reward he requires. Nor am I 
aware of any objective system of measurement. The only appar- 
ent way to resolve this problem is to allow the remaining mem- 
bers of society to define the additional inducement which the 
taxpayer in question should receive by bidding for his services in 
a free market. Thus Klein's theory, which was intended to move 
us away from a marketplace allocation of income, takes us back 
to the marketpla~e.~-ince there is no conceivable way to sepa- 
33. W. KLEIN, supra note 4, at 32, 35. 
34. Id. at 35. 
35. To the extent Klein's theory is based on Rawls', it partakes of the infirmities 
asserted by Rawls' critics. See, e .g. ,  R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 183-231 
(1974). But since Klein's theory is directed to matters of taxation, I am examining it 
principally from a tax standpoint and am avoiding a general critique of the Rawlsian 
system. 
36. Klein seems to recognize this without appreciating its impact on his theory. W. 
KLEIN, supra note 4, at 33. 
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rate a talented taxpayer's marketplace income into its constitu- 
ent elements under Klein's system-i.e., basic income for hours 
worked, minimum additional inducement, and unjust payment 
for advantages in talent-there is no way to determine the portion 
of a taxpayer's income which should be red i~ t r ibu ted .~~  The only 
path around this problem is to drop the minimum additional 
inducement element from Klein's system and allow taxpayers to 
receive or retain only income based on total hours worked a t  the 
uniformly applicable wage rate. My hunch is that the cost in 
economic efficiency from this approach would greatly exceed the 
value of any gains in fairness.38 
Klein's system has an additional Achilles' heel. He argues 
that since a distribution of income based on hours worked at  the 
basic wage plus minimum additional inducement is just, and in 
no need of redistribution, a person who foregoes the pleasure of 
presently consuming his just income by investing it and exposing 
i t  to the risk of loss should be allowed to receive his investment 
return tax-free. Stated differently, the return on investment of 
justly distributed income should not be subject to redistribu- 
tion." From this analysis, Klein draws the following conclusion: 
[Qf a person works as a dishwasher and uses part of his earn- 
ings to buy piano lessons, his return on that investment (but not 
the return from his natural talent) should be free from taxation, 
as should the return on the investment of his leisure in practice 
(training). Investment of leisure in training oneself is analogous 
to effort in the nature of giving of oneself. To the extent one 
believes (as I do not) that most differences in reward under 
capitalism are attributable to such investments, the case for a 
progressive income tax is undercut.40 
Even if we agree with Klein that most income inequalities 
are due to differences in natural talent rather than differences in 
effort or differences in talent created through invested effort, the 
fact remains that few of the "natural" talents which produce high 
incomes would be as productive without a considerable invest- 
37. Compare BLUM, supra note 8, at 67. 
38. The literature suggesting that high rates of taxation do not seriously affect will- 
ingness to work, see note 30 supra, seems inapplicable at this point since effective rates 
of taxation have never, in this country at least, approached the level which would seem 
required to bring about an income redistribution giving all taxpayers an equal income for 
equal hours worked. See R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 283-85 (1964); [I9741 
ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 139-41. 
39. W. KLEIN, supra note 4 ,  at 39-41. 
40. Id. at 41. 
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ment in practice and training." At least my experience with 
bright undergraduates who are unwilling to expend the effort 
necessary to become successful law students and with bright law 
students who are unwilling to devote the time required to become 
good practitioners leads me to that conclusion. Since virtually 
every high income producing talent becomes such through the 
invested effort required to bring it to fruition, and since efforts 
devoted to training and education frequently fail to produce in- 
come a t  the time the effort is expended, higher economic rewards 
to the possessors of such developed talent are, at  least in part, 
rewards for either additional effort or undercompensated past 
effort. Lacking any method for breaking a talented person's in- 
come from services into (i) the rewards for present effort, prior 
invested effort, and invested income (which should not be redis- 
tributed) and (ii) the reward for possessing raw talent (which 
should be redistributed), we are unable to tell which portion of 
his income should be shifted from him to others. 
We might dismiss the foregoing deficiencies by saying that 
Klein's theory is not intended to provide a guide to a working 
income tax system but is merely designed to show that the free 
market distribution of income is unjust and that some progression 
is in order to mitigate this unfairness. It is not enough, however, 
to say that  some progression should exist. The difficult issue 
which a useful theory must answer is how progressive the system 
should be. If we employ too much progression, then we presuma- 
bly redistribute income which taxpayers should be allowed to 
retain under Klein's system.42 Unfortunately, Klein's theory pro- 
vides no way of ascertaining the dividing line between "too 
nuch" and "too little." 
For the foregoing reasons, I find Professor Klein's defense of 
progression wanting. He has, however, moved the debate over 
progression away from declining marginal utility of money analy- 
sis43 and loose talk about ability to pay to more fundamental 
questions of redistribution. His theory represents a sophisticated 
structure, which deserves careful attention by anyone seeking the 
still undiscovered objective case for progression. 
-- -p 
41. BLUM, supra note 8, at 83. The direct and indirect costs of such training are often 
substantial. See McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit Legislation: Federal Income Tax 
Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 18-22 (1973). 
42. Compare BLUM, supra note 8, at 45-46, 81. 
43. For an exhaustive critique of attempts to justify progression through declining 
marginal utility of money analysis, see BLUM, supra note 8, at 39-63. 
BOOK REVIEW 
Turning from his analysis of progression, Professor Klein in- 
troduces the reader to the case for an income tax based on con- 
sumption by including extensive excerpts from Professor 
Andrews' stimulating article on the subject." Interspersed among 
these excerpts are useful comments by Professor Klein. This por- 
tion of the book serves to alert the reader to the existence of other 
types of income taxes and their relative advantages. 
Klein next examines tax policy criteria, chiefly by reproduc- 
ing Judge Sneed's thoughtful article on the subject." He then 
uses extensive excerpts from Professor Bittker's wry demolition of 
the comprehensive tax base concept4"o argue that the compre- 
hensive tax base fails to provide a useful guide for consistent 
answers to questions of tax policy. Klein's evident position is that 
there is no general formula which provides such answers and that 
the desirability of each exclusion, deduction, and preferential 
rate proposed and existing under the income tax law must be 
resolved by ad hoc application of the policy criteria provided by 
Judge Sneed and others. 
The remaining two-thirds of the book is devoted primarily to 
reproduction of law review articles and book excerpts, and some 
new work by Professor Klein, which provide examples of the rigor- 
ous application of sound analysis to a wide range of fundamental 
income tax issues, such as the deduction for travel and entertain- 
ment expenses, the charitable contribution deduction, the medi- 
cal expense deduction, the proposals for a credit or deduction for 
education expenses, the exemption for municipal bond interest, 
accelerated depreciation, the investment credit, the capital gains 
preference, and income splitting. Included in this material are 
helpful sections on the incidence and effect of the corporate in- 
come tax and the effect of the income tax on incentives to work. 
For the patient reader, all of the foregoing provides a rigorous and 
stimulating set of exercises in tax policy analysis that should be 
useful to law students and practitioners. 
In fact, this material is so uniformly good that only reluc- 
tantly will I suggest an addition. Klein correctly observes that 
"most participants in current [tax policy] debates probably 
44. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HAW. L. 
REV. 1113 (1974). 
45. Sneed, The Criteriu of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1965). 
46. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax BaseY'As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HAW. 
L. REV. 925 (1967). 
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have never engaged in any systematic examination of basic philo- 
sophic and economic guideposts. They take sides in battles with- 
out adequately understanding how the outcome will affect the 
war, and what the war is all about."47 One of the principal reasons 
for this lack of understanding by participants in tax policy con- 
troversies is that arguments over tax policy are traditionally 
clothed in rhetoric which is a t  best uninformative and at  worst 
misleading. Yet the rhetoric is so regularly heard that many be- 
lieve it actually means something. Louis Eisenstein's The Ideol- 
ogies of T a ~ a t i o n , ~  in spite of its obvious flaws," made an im- 
portant contribution to the study of tax policy by systematically 
laying bare the emptiness of traditional dogma. The already con- 
siderable usefulness of Professor Klein's book would have been 
enhanced by reproduction of portions of Eisenstein's work. 
Professor Klein's book is not an encyclopedia of tax policy for 
quick reference. Consequently, it will not be useful to most prac- 
titioners and, therefore, will not satisfy one of the goals which 
motivated its creation?O Tax practitioners, however, who take 
time to use it and law students laboring without choice under the 
whips and goads of tax teachers will find the book to be a compre- 
hensive, intellectually demanding survey of both the fundamen- 
tal issues of income tax policy and the tools necessary for resolu- 
tion. 
Although I have found fault with portions of the book, the 
space devoted to this review should be an obvious testimony to 
the book's challenging and stimulating content, which outweighs 
my criticisms on any scales sufficient to measure such things. 
Professor Klein has produced an important, high quality piece of 
work, and I recommend it to anyone seriously seeking an under- 
standing of income tax policy. 
47. W. KLEIN, supra note 4, at 1. 
48. Note 14 supra. 
49. See Blum, Book Review, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 692 (1961); Sander, Book Review, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1964). 
50. W. KLEIN, supra note 4, at xvii. 
